Intersubjectivity or Solipsism? Problems with Jurgen Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action

The following article argues that the intersubjectivity claimed by the theory of communicative action is undermined by the monological solipsismintrinsic to the very premises upon which it is based. In terms of structure, the central thread of the article is the reflexivity of the language (section 1). The problem with the intersubjectivity emerges as the article shifts from analyzing the public sphere in the eighteenth century to the procedural paradigm of deliberative democracy (section II). It is between these institutional extremities that Habermas locates his anti-institutional theory of language, supported on the "ideal speech situation" (section III). In the aim of ensuring engagement in the search for linguistic understanding, the participants in a discussion must act according to a rule of sincerity (section IV), which presumes a prior moral commitment (that is therefore monological) to the search for a consensus (section V). Such issues undermine the deliberative model of democracy because they convert the ideal of discursive symmetry into the empirical founding of democratic deliberation (section VI).