Central bank transparency: Does it matter?

被引:11
|
作者
Rhee, Hyuk Jae [1 ]
Turdaliev, Nurlan [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Windsor, Dept Econ, Windsor, ON N9B 3P4, Canada
关键词
Monetary policy; Transparency; Central bank; Ramsey problem; MONETARY-POLICY; SOCIAL VALUE; COMMUNICATION; CREDIBILITY; INFORMATION; DISCRETION; INFLATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.iref.2012.09.014
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We study transparency of monetary policy in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. The economy consists of many industries and experiences both supply and demand shocks. The central bank has private information regarding these shocks and releases its forecasts of shocks under the transparent regime. For a certain class of preferences social welfare does not depend on the degree of transparency and the policy that keeps the wedge between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal product of labor constant across the states is shown to be optimal. However, in general the opaque regime welfare dominates the transparent regime. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:183 / 197
页数:15
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