Municipal politics and forest governance: Comparative analysis of decentralization in Bolivia and Guatemala

被引:92
|
作者
Andersson, KP [1 ]
Gibson, CC
Lehoucq, F
机构
[1] Univ Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309 USA
[2] Univ Calif San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA
[3] Ctr Invest & Docencia Econ, Mexico City, DF, Mexico
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Latin America; Bolivia; Guatemala; decentralization; incentives; forestry;
D O I
10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.08.009
中图分类号
F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
The success of efforts to decentralize governance responsibilities hinges upon the incentives of local politicians. We test this argument by studying the experiences of forestry sector decentralization in Bolivia and Guatemala. We analyze the survey responses of 200 mayors and show that local-level institutional incentives are systematically linked to variations in local politicians' interest and investment decisions in the forestry sector. Further, we find that a decentralization policy that transfers very limited decision-making powers to local governments stifles local interest in organizing resource governance activities. (c) 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:576 / 595
页数:20
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