The Pricing of Risk and Sentiment: A Study of Executive Stock Options

被引:4
|
作者
Chang, Charles [1 ,2 ]
Chen, Li-jiun [3 ]
Fuh, Cheng-der [3 ]
机构
[1] Shanghai Adv Inst Finance, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[2] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[3] Natl Cent Univ, Chungli 32054, Taiwan
关键词
EMPLOYEE SENTIMENT; COMPENSATION; FIRMS; INCENTIVES; EXERCISE; MANAGERS; COST;
D O I
10.1111/j.1755-053X.2012.01216.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Option pricing models accounting for illiquidity generally imply the options are valued at a discount to the Black-Scholes value. Our model considers the role of sentiment, which offsets illiquidity. Using executive stock options and compensation data from 1992 to 2004 for S&P 1500 firms, we find that executives value employee stock options (ESOs) at a 48% premium to the Black-Scholes value. These premia are explained by a sentiment level of 12% in risk-adjusted, annualized return, suggesting a high level of executive overconfidence. Subjective value relates negatively to illiquidity and idiosyncratic risk, and positively to sentiment in all specifications, consistent with the offsetting roles of sentiment and risk aversion.
引用
收藏
页码:79 / 99
页数:21
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