Bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining in monopoly

被引：1
|
作者：
Chatterjee, Ishita [1 ]
Saha, Bibhas [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Western Australia, Dept Econ, Crawley, WA 6009, Australia
[2] Univ E Anglia, Sch Econ, Norwich NR4 7TJ, Norfolk, England
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2013年 / 120卷 / 02期
关键词：
Managerial incentives; Efficient bargaining; Bilateral delegation; INCENTIVES;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.009
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We study efficiency and distributional implications of bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining in monopoly. Delegation causes underproduction, and the bargaining pie severely contracts rendering mutual gains from delegation impossible. With an increase in the union's bargaining power profit may perversely rise and the union's utility may fall. (C) 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：280 / 283
页数：4
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