Inapproximability results for combinatorial auctions with submodular utility functions

被引：0
|
作者：
Khot, S [1 ]
Lipton, RJ [1 ]
Markakis, E [1 ]
Mehta, A [1 ]
机构：
[1] Georgia Inst Technol, Atlanta, GA 30332 USA
来源：
INTERNET AND NETWORK ECONOMICS, PROCEEDINGS | 2005年 / 3828卷
关键词：
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
TP39 [计算机的应用];
学科分类号：
081203 ; 0835 ;
摘要：
We consider the following allocation problem arising in the setting of combinatorial auctions: a set of goods is to be allocated to a set of players so as to maximize the sum of the utilities of the players (i.e., the social welfare). In the case when the utility of each player is a monotone submodular function, we prove that there is no polynomial time approximation algorithm which approximates the maximum social welfare by a factor better than 1 - 1/e similar or equal to 0.632, unless P = NP. Our result is based on a reduction from a multi-prover proof system for MAX-3-COLORlNG.
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页码：92 / 101
页数：10
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