Central bank accountability and independence: Are they inconsistent?

被引:2
|
作者
Hetzel, Robert L. [1 ]
机构
[1] Fed Reserve Bank Richmond, Richmond, VA 23261 USA
关键词
Central bank; Monetary policy; Political economy of money; Federal Reserve System;
D O I
10.1016/j.jmacro.2012.02.010
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The language of discretion offers little information about monetary policy beyond the assurance that policymakers always "do the right thing at the right time". This language renders problematic the reconciliation of central bank independence with accountability. Monetary policymakers should articulate an analytical framework using the language of economics that allows them to respond to the question, "What variables does the central bank control and how does it exercise that control". (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:616 / 625
页数:10
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [21] Central banks:: Independence, accountability, credibility
    Jonás, J
    [J]. FINANCE A UVER, 1999, 49 (09): : 525 - 542
  • [22] Optimal inflation contracts and inflation targets with uncertain central bank preferences: Accountability through independence?
    Muscatelli, A
    [J]. ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1998, 108 (447): : 529 - 542
  • [23] The independence of the European Central Bank
    不详
    [J]. TEORIA Y REALIDAD CONSTITUCIONAL, 2006, 18 : 596 - 596
  • [24] A REVIEW OF CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
    Kolar, Martin
    [J]. PROCEEDINGS OF 12TH INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE: ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER COUNTRIES, PTS I AND II, 2015, : 415 - 423
  • [25] THE POLITICS OF CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
    GOODMAN, JB
    [J]. COMPARATIVE POLITICS, 1991, 23 (03) : 329 - 349
  • [26] Populism and Central Bank Independence
    Goodhart, Charles
    Lastra, Rosa
    [J]. OPEN ECONOMIES REVIEW, 2018, 29 (01) : 49 - 68
  • [27] Populism and Central Bank Independence
    Charles Goodhart
    Rosa Lastra
    [J]. Open Economies Review, 2018, 29 : 49 - 68
  • [28] Central Bank Independence Revisited
    Walsh, Carl E.
    [J]. ECONOMIC PAPERS, 2011, 30 (01): : 18 - 22
  • [29] The independence and autonomy of the Central Bank
    Gonzales de Olarte, Efran
    [J]. REVISTA ECONOMIA, 2011, 34 (68): : 210 - 214
  • [30] Understanding Central Bank Independence
    Marshall, Wesley C.
    Rochon, Louis-Philippe
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2022, 51 (04) : 346 - 373