Sequential and concurrent auction mechanisms for dynamic spectrum access

With the ever growing demands for spectrum, authorities (e.g., FCC in United States) are defining ways that allow reallocation of spectrum bands that are under-utilized. In this regard, FCC made provisions to open under-utilized bands for both licensed and unlicensed services. A new paradigm called dynamic spectrum access (DSA) is being investigated that would allow wireless service providers (WSPs) to dynamically seek more spectrum when and where they need without interfering with the primary users. Currently, there is little understanding on how such a dynamic allocation of spectrum will operate so as to make the system feasible under economic terms. In this paper, we analyze the dynamic spectrum allocation process from an auction theoretic point of view where n WSPs (bidders) compete to acquire necessary spectrum band from a pool of m (n > m) spectrum chunks. For the purpose of self-coexistence, each of the WSPs is granted at most one chunk of spectrum to minimize interference among themselves and with licensed services. In this regard, we investigate both sequential and concurrent auction mechanisms to find WSPs' optimal price bid and compare both the auction mechanisms in terms of revenue generated. We show that sequential auction is a better mechanism for DSA.