Party Control in China's Listed Firms

被引:0
|
作者
Yu, Wei [1 ]
机构
[1] Shanghai Univ Int Business & Econ, Finance Sch, Shanghai, Peoples R China
关键词
Chinese Communist Party (CCP); party secretary; government intervention;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Along with state shareholding and government administration, the third source of political control of Chinese listed firms is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Using a unique hand-collected dataset that includes party secretary information for listed firms between 2000 and 2004, we examine the existence and power of party secretaries in companies. The party secretary is the leader of the party committee and exercises the power of the CCP at firm level. Power is assessed by examining whether the party secretary concurrently holds another key management position, such as chairman or CEO, thus allowing him or her to exert influence on the managerial decisions of the firm. We find that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and firms with many employees are more likely to have a party secretary or a powerful party secretary than are other firms. Party secretaries are more likely to have political reliability but less professionalism than CEOs and other senior managers.
引用
收藏
页码:382 / 397
页数:16
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [31] Ownership Concentration, Identity and Firm Performance:Evidence from China?s Listed Firms
    Wang, Hongmei
    Wu, Jun
    Yang, Yuhong
    Li, Ruihai
    Liu, Yuping
    EMERGING MARKETS FINANCE AND TRADE, 2019, 55 (15) : 3653 - 3666
  • [32] Analysis of capital structure stability of listed firms in China
    Kyissima, Kelvin Henry
    Xue, Gong Zhang
    Kossele, Thales Pacific Yapatake
    Abeid, Ahmed Ramadhan
    CHINA FINANCE REVIEW INTERNATIONAL, 2020, 10 (02) : 213 - 228
  • [33] Systemic Risk Measurement of Listed Securities Firms in China
    Ma Leiyong
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE 8TH (2016) INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FINANCIAL RISK AND CORPORATE FINANCE MANAGEMENT, 2016, : 307 - 312
  • [34] Electricity shortage and corporate digital transformation: Evidence from China's listed firms
    Jia, Shanghui
    Guo, Nannan
    Liu, Yingke
    FINANCE RESEARCH LETTERS, 2023, 57
  • [35] Bank connections and the speed of leverage adjustment: evidence from China's listed firms
    Li, Wenfei
    Wu, Cen
    Xu, Liping
    Tang, Qingquan
    ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE, 2017, 57 (05): : 1349 - 1381
  • [36] Political connections, founder-managers, and their impact on tunneling in China's listed firms
    Ma, Liangbo
    Ma, Shiguang
    Tian, Gary
    PACIFIC-BASIN FINANCE JOURNAL, 2013, 24 : 312 - 339
  • [37] Location and agglomeration of headquarters of publicly listed firms within China's urban system
    Pan, Fenghua
    Xia, Yabo
    URBAN GEOGRAPHY, 2014, 35 (05) : 757 - 779
  • [38] Ownership and ownership concentration: which is important in determining the performance of China's listed firms?
    Ma, Shiguang
    Naughton, Tony
    Tian, Gary
    ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE, 2010, 50 (04): : 871 - 897
  • [39] Financial reporting quality of ESG firms listed in China
    Wu, Mengqian
    Abeysekera, Indra
    PLOS ONE, 2023, 18 (06):
  • [40] Spatial Distribution Pattern of the Headquarters of Listed Firms in China
    Zhang, Ling
    Zhang, Hui
    Yang, Hao
    SUSTAINABILITY, 2018, 10 (07)