Party Control in China's Listed Firms

被引:0
|
作者
Yu, Wei [1 ]
机构
[1] Shanghai Univ Int Business & Econ, Finance Sch, Shanghai, Peoples R China
关键词
Chinese Communist Party (CCP); party secretary; government intervention;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Along with state shareholding and government administration, the third source of political control of Chinese listed firms is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Using a unique hand-collected dataset that includes party secretary information for listed firms between 2000 and 2004, we examine the existence and power of party secretaries in companies. The party secretary is the leader of the party committee and exercises the power of the CCP at firm level. Power is assessed by examining whether the party secretary concurrently holds another key management position, such as chairman or CEO, thus allowing him or her to exert influence on the managerial decisions of the firm. We find that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and firms with many employees are more likely to have a party secretary or a powerful party secretary than are other firms. Party secretaries are more likely to have political reliability but less professionalism than CEOs and other senior managers.
引用
收藏
页码:382 / 397
页数:16
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Political control and performance in China's listed firms
    Chang, EC
    Wong, SML
    [J]. JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS, 2004, 32 (04) : 617 - 636
  • [2] The investment incentive and performance of China's listed firms
    Wan, JQ
    Xu, T
    [J]. PROCEEDINGS OF 2003 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MANAGEMENT SCIENCE & ENGINEERING, VOLS I AND II, 2003, : 1815 - 1821
  • [3] Financial Reporting Practices of China's Listed Firms
    Piotroski, Joseph D.
    [J]. JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, 2014, 26 (03) : 53 - +
  • [4] Ownership concentration and financial policy of China's listed firms
    Choi, Heejung
    Kim, Ju Hyun
    Suh, Jungwon
    Yu, Shuilian
    [J]. CHINA ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2023, 79
  • [5] An explanation of capital structure of China's listed property firms
    Liang, Jian
    Li, Liu Fang
    Song, Han-Suck
    [J]. PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, 2014, 32 (01) : 4 - +
  • [6] Government control and the value of cash: evidence from listed firms in China
    Yu, Xinyu
    Wang, Ping
    [J]. REVIEW OF QUANTITATIVE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING, 2020, 55 (04) : 1341 - 1369
  • [7] Internal Control and the Value of Listed Firms in China: Based on Agency Theory
    Wu, Long
    Bao, Na
    [J]. 5TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION MANAGEMENT (ICIM 2019), 2019, : 292 - 296
  • [8] The independent directors' Communist Party of China member status and firms' ESG performance: Evidence from Chinese listed firms
    Jia, Fang
    Li, Xuerong
    Gao, Yan
    [J]. HELIYON, 2024, 10 (17)
  • [9] Government control and the value of cash: evidence from listed firms in China
    Xinyu Yu
    Ping Wang
    [J]. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2020, 55 : 1341 - 1369
  • [10] Determinants of diversification by listed firms in China
    Jiang, Fuxiu
    [J]. FRONTIERS OF BUSINESS RESEARCH IN CHINA, 2008, 2 (02) : 170 - 186