Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness

被引:134
|
作者
Crowe, Christopher [2 ]
Meade, Ellen E. [1 ]
机构
[1] American Univ, Washington, DC 20016 USA
[2] Int Monetary Fund, Washington, DC 20431 USA
关键词
Central bank independence; Transparency; Monetary policy;
D O I
10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.06.004
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Over the past two decades, the pace of central bank reforms in terms of institutional independence and transparency has been particularly brisk. This paper examines the Current level of central bank independence (CBI) and transparency in a broad sample of countries using newly constructed measures, and looks at the evolution in both measures from an earlier time period. The legal independence of central banks has increased markedly since the 1980s, while the rise in transparency since the late 1990s has been less impressive. Exploiting the time dimension of our data to eliminate country fixed effects and using instrumental variable estimation to overcome endogeneity concerns, we present robust evidence that greater CBI is associated with lower inflation. We also find that enhanced transparency practices are associated with the private sector making greater use of information provided by the central bank. (C) 2008 International Monetary Fund. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:763 / 777
页数:15
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