Illusionism and Givenness

被引:0
|
作者
Garfield, Jay L. [1 ]
机构
[1] Smith Coll, Humanities & Prof Philosophy Log & Buddhist Studi, Northampton, MA 01063 USA
关键词
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
There is no phenomenal consciousness; there is nothing 'that it is like' to be me. To believe in phenomenal consciousness or 'what-it's-like-ness' or for-me-ness' is to succumb to a pernicious form of the Myth of the Given. I argue that there are no good arguments for the existence of such a kind of consciousness and draw on arguments from Buddhist philosophy of mind to show that the sense that there is such a kind of consciousness is an instance of cognitive illusion.
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页码:73 / 82
页数:10
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