The Optimization of Multitask Incentive Contracts of R&D Personnel

This paper formulates a model of principal-agent on the condition of asymmetrical information when R&D personnel are engaged in two actions of "innovating" and "getting slack resources" at the same time. Through the analysis of the model, this paper obtains the optimal incentive contracts. If the outcome of R&D personnel's "getting slack resources" is measurable, the principal should give them reward directly according to the optimal incentive contracts. If the outcome of R&D personnel's "getting slack resources" is not measurable, the principal should strengthen the incentive to the "innovating" action when the cost functions of the "innovating" and "getting slack resources" are complementary; the principal should weaken the incentive to the "innovating" when the cost functions of the two actions are substitute. If the "innovating" is not tight time constraints, strengthening the incentive to the agent's "innovating" can improve the agent's performance of "getting slack sources".