A review of game-theoretic models of road user behaviour

This paper reviews game-theoretic models that have been developed to explain road user behaviour in situations where road users interact with each other. The paper includes the following game-theoretic models: 1. A general model of the interaction between road users and their possible reaction to measures improving safety (behavioural adaptation). 2. Choice of vehicle size as a Prisoners' dilemma game. 3. Speed choice as a co-ordination game. 4. Speed compliance as a game between drivers and the police. 5. Merging into traffic from an acceleration lane as a mixed-strategy game. 6. Choice of level of attention in following situations as an evolutionary game. 7. Choice of departure time to avoid congestion as variant of a Prisoners' dilemma game. 8. Interaction between cyclists crossing the road and car drivers. 9. Dipping headlights at night well ahead of the point when glare becomes noticeable. 10. Choice of evasive action in a situation when cars are on collision course. The models reviewed are different in many respects, but a common feature of the models is that they can explain how informal norms of behaviour can develop among road users and be sustained even if these informal norms violate the formal regulations of the traffic code. Game-theoretic models are not applicable to every conceivable interaction between road users or to situations in which road users choose behaviour without interacting with other road users. Nevertheless, it is likely that game-theoretic models can be applied more widely than they have been until now. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.