A Strategy-Proof Model-Based Online Auction for Ad Reservation

被引：0
|
作者：
Li, Qinya [1 ]
Wu, Fan [1 ]
Chen, Guihai [1 ]
机构：
[1] Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Shanghai, Peoples R China
来源：
PRICAI 2019: TRENDS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, PT I | 2019年 / 11670卷
基金：
国家重点研发计划;
关键词：
Ad reservation; Auction theory; Strategy proofness; Game theory; Mechanism design;
D O I：
10.1007/978-3-030-29908-8_48
中图分类号：
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号：
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要：
Ad reservation market is an important part of the Internet advertising industry. Advertisers expect to reserve ad slots in advance, while auctioneers need a mechanism for allocating ad slots and maximizing profits. We propose SMAR, which is a Strategy-proof Model-based online Auction for ad Reservation, to meet their needs. SMAR allows the cancelation policy. It means auctioneers can revoke the reservation and resell ad slots to advertisers with higher bids. SMAR achieves both incentive compatibility and individual rationality. We implement SMAR and compare it with offline VCG and other related works. The results show SMAR has a better performance in both social welfare and revenue.
引用
收藏
页码：612 / 617
页数：6
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