Collusive conduct in private label markets

被引:26
|
作者
Kim, N
Parker, PM
机构
[1] Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Dept Mkt, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[2] INSEAD, F-77305 Fontainebleau, France
关键词
retailing; private-label brands; advertising; price; market power; collusion;
D O I
10.1016/S0167-8116(99)00005-1
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper considers retailers' pricing strategies when they sell both nationally-advertised brands and quality-equivalent private label brands (a form of store, house or own-label branding). We investigate the impact of advertising on the ability of retailers to increase profitability across all brands. Supporting recent theoretical arguments (though contradicting others), our industry study reveals that retailers can react to the heavy advertising amongst national brands by increasing prices, revenues, and economic profits generated from both national brands and private-label brands. For the category studied, retailers' strategies may include setting collusive prices for both national brands and private-label brands. We use a structural test to support this conclusion. Management interviews further support this finding. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:143 / 155
页数:13
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