Feigning Compliance: Covert Action and International Law

Why do leaders sometimes turn to covert action when overthrowing foreign regimes? Many scholars locate secrecy's appeal in its capacity to help control escalation dynamics or shield vulnerable politicians from domestic audience costs. This article instead identifies international law as the main determinant of covert regime change. I argue that leaders are more likely to pursue secrecy when they lack a legal exemption from the nonintervention principle, such as a credible self-defense claim or authorization from an international body. Brazen violations of nonintervention invite hypocrisy costs and damage a state's credibility. Leaders are more likely to choose overt action when one or more legal exemptions are available. I test my argument against two cases of US-led regime change in the Cold War, one covert and one overt: the Bay of Pigs and the invasion of Grenada, respectively. This article advances debates on political secrecy, international law, and the future of the liberal order.