Imperfect certification in a Bertrand duopoly

被引：4
|
作者：
Bottega, Lucie [1 ]
De Freitas, Jenny [2 ]
机构：
[1] Toulouse Sch Econ, Manufacture Tabacs 21,Allees Brienne, F-31015 Toulouse 6, France
[2] Univ Balearic Isl, Dept Appl Econ, Cra Valldemossa Km 7, Palma De Mallorca 07122, Spain
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2019年 / 178卷
关键词：
Asymmetric information; Quality certification; Imperfect test; Labeling; Bertrand duopoly; Separating equilibrium; MARKET;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2019.02.014
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
A label that imperfectly signals product quality is analyzed in a Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products. Considering strategic firms when certification is imperfect has some important implications. A separating equilibrium can be sustained with a free test due to price strategic complementarity. When the certifier's objective is welfare, and the test cost is sufficiently small, the most appropriate test is that which is subject to a low rate of false negatives. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：33 / 36
页数：4
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