Repression, Dissent, and the Onset of Civil War

被引:47
|
作者
Young, Joseph K. [1 ]
机构
[1] Amer Univ, Washington, DC 20016 USA
关键词
civil war onset; repression; dissent; PERSONAL INTEGRITY; STATE REPRESSION; SUBSTITUTION; DEMOCRACIES; CAPACITY; PEACE;
D O I
10.1177/1065912912452485
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
The prevailing scholarly wisdom is that weak states, or resource-poor states, are the most prone to civil war. Yet many weak states never experience civil war. Why then are some weak states prone to civil war while others are not? The author offers a theory that explains how dissidents and states interact to jointly produce civil war. In sum, states that repress their citizens are the most likely to kill citizens and to generate dissident violence. This insight resolves an academic puzzle and when tested provides a model with better predictive ability than previous models.
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收藏
页码:516 / 532
页数:17
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