Electoral rules and voter turnout

被引:17
|
作者
Barone, Guglielmo [1 ]
de Blasio, Guido [2 ]
机构
[1] Bank Italy, Reg Econ Res Div, Bologna Branch, Bologna, Italy
[2] Bank Italy, Struct Econ Anal Dept, Bologna, Italy
关键词
Voter turnout; Electoral systems; Regression discontinuity design; REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY DESIGNS; SYSTEMS; MAIL;
D O I
10.1016/j.irle.2013.04.001
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The paper investigates the effect of electoral rules on voter turnout. It focuses on Italian municipalities, where a single ballot system applies to municipalities with less than 15,000 inhabitants, while a dual ballot system applies above that threshold. By exploiting this discontinuity, the paper finds that the dual ballot increases participation at the local polls by about 1 percentage point. The increase in voter turnout is associated with broader political representation, higher quality politicians, and greater fiscal discipline. Finally, we document that the higher political participation triggered by local electoral rules extends to nationwide voting contexts. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:25 / 35
页数:11
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