Evaluating the effects of ACE systems on multinational debt financing and investment

被引:22
|
作者
Hebous, Shafik [1 ,2 ]
Ruf, Martin [3 ]
机构
[1] IMF, 700 19th St NW, Washington, DC 20431 USA
[2] Goethe Univ Frankfurt, Dept Econ, Grueneburgpl 1, Frankfurt, Germany
[3] Univ Tubingen, Tubingen, Germany
关键词
ACE; Financial structure; Corporate taxation; Debt bias; Multinational firms; CAPITAL STRUCTURE CHOICE; TAX; TAXATION; UNCERTAINTY; LEVERAGE; MARKETS; DESIGN; PROFIT; POLICY; RISK;
D O I
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.02.011
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Theory recommends aligning the tax treatment of debt and equity. A few countries, notably Belgium, have introduced an allowance for corporate equity (ACE) to achieve tax neutrality. We study the effects of adopting an ACE on debt financing, passive investment, and active investment of multinational firms, using high quality administrative data on virtually all German-based multinationals. We use two main identification strategies, based on (1) synthetic control methods and (2) variations across affiliates within the multinational group. Our results suggest that an ACE reduces the corporate debt ratio of multinational affiliates. Additionally, an ACE increases intra-group lending and other forms of passive investment but has no effects on production investment of multinational affiliates. The findings indicate that a unilateral implementation of an ACE system generates a tax planning opportunity using a structure combining the benefits from the ACE with interest deductions. (C) 2017 International Monetary Fund. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:131 / 149
页数:19
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