A cost-sharing method for an economic lot-sizing game

被引：23
|
作者：
Xu, Dachuan [1 ]
Yang, Ruichun [2 ]
机构：
[1] Beijing Univ Technol, Dept Appl Math, Beijing 100124, Peoples R China
[2] Hebei North Univ, Coll Sci, Zhangjiakou 075000, Peoples R China
来源：
OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS | 2009年 / 37卷 / 02期
关键词：
Economic lot-sizing game; Cross-monotonicity; Competitiveness; Approximate cost recovery; FACILITY LOCATION PROBLEM; APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS; MODEL; CORE;
D O I：
10.1016/j.orl.2008.11.001
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号：
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
We present a cost-sharing method that is competitive, cross-monotonic and approximate cost recovering for an economic lot-sizing game under a weak triangle inequality assumption, along with numerical results showing the effectiveness of the proposed method. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：107 / 110
页数：4
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