Applied game theory;
Co-determination;
Corporate governance;
Power index;
WORKS COUNCILS;
AGENCY COSTS;
FIRM;
DETERMINANTS;
PERFORMANCE;
EFFICIENCY;
SIZE;
CODETERMINATION;
DIVERSIFICATION;
OWNERSHIP;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jebo.2013.04.004
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
The debate on employee representation on corporate boards has received considerable attention from scholars and politicians around the world. We provide new insights to this ongoing discussion by applying power indices from game theory to examine the actual voting power of employees on boards and its effect on firm performance. Based on unique panel data on the largest listed companies in Germany, we find an inverse U-shaped relationship between labor power and Tobin's Q. Moderate employee participation in corporate board decision-making can enhance firm value. (C) 2013 Published by Elsevier B.V.
机构:
Univ Amsterdam, Fac Econ & Bedrijfskunde, NL-1018 TV Amsterdam, NetherlandsUniv Amsterdam, Fac Econ & Bedrijfskunde, NL-1018 TV Amsterdam, Netherlands
机构:
Department of Economics and Management, University of Pisa, Via Cosimo Ridolfi, 10, Pisa (PI)Department of Economics and Management, University of Pisa, Via Cosimo Ridolfi, 10, Pisa (PI)
Fanti L.
Buccella D.
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机构:
Department of Economics, Kozminski University, Jagełłonska Street, 57/59, WarsawDepartment of Economics and Management, University of Pisa, Via Cosimo Ridolfi, 10, Pisa (PI)