Judgment aggregation;
Group decisions;
Logic;
Voting paradoxes;
Aggregation rukes;
Social choice theory;
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY;
DISCURSIVE DILEMMA;
IMPOSSIBILITY;
MODEL;
SETS;
D O I:
10.1007/s10992-015-9357-7
中图分类号:
B81 [逻辑学(论理学)];
学科分类号:
010104 ;
010105 ;
摘要:
Judgment aggregation studies how individual opinions on a given set of propositions can be aggregated to form a consistent group judgment on the same propositions. Despite the simplicity of the problem, seemingly natural aggregation procedures fail to return consistent collective outcomes, leading to what is now known as the doctrinal paradox. The first occurrences of the paradox were discovered in the legal realm. However, the interest of judgment aggregation is much broader and extends to political philosophy, epistemology, social choice theory, and computer science. The aim of this paper is to provide a concise survey of the discipline and to outline some of the most pressing questions and future lines of research.
机构:
London Business Sch, Dept Govt, London, England
London Business Sch, Dept Philosophy, London, EnglandLondon Business Sch, Dept Govt, London, England
List, Christian
Polak, Ben
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机构:
Yale Univ, Dept Econ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
Yale Univ, Sch Management, New Haven, CT 06520 USALondon Business Sch, Dept Govt, London, England