Location of Unwanted Facilities in the City of Prague

被引:0
|
作者
Dlouhy, Martin [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Econ Prague, Fac Informat & Stat, W Churchill Sq 4, Prague 3, Czech Republic
关键词
LULUs; NIMBY; Prague; public administration; negative externality; NIMBY;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The objectives of the paper are, first, to investigate how the problem of NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) related to the location of unwanted facilities is dealt in a hierarchically organized city, second, to classify observed approaches to NIMBY into specific categories. The NIMBY effect is studied as a conflict between the City of Prague, representing global interests of the city, and city districts, representing local interests of communities. We classified approaches to NIMBY into four categories: financial compensation, fair distribution, local autonomy, and consultation. We observed that city districts, lower level of public administration, behave as guardians of local interests if they communicate with the higher level of public administration. As politicians depend on their local voters, it is not surprising.
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页码:39 / 44
页数:6
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