Government's response to hurricane katrina: A public choice analysis

被引:124
|
作者
Sobel, Russell S. [1 ]
Leeson, Peter T. [1 ]
机构
[1] W Virginia Univ, Dept Econ, Morgantown, WV 26506 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1007/s11127-006-7730-3
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We use public choice theory to explain the failure of FEMA and other governmental agencies to carry out effective disaster relief in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. The areas in which we focus are: (1) the tragedy of the anti-commons resulting from layered bureaucracy, (2) a type-two error policy bias causing over cautiousness in decision making, (3) the political manipulation of disaster declarations and relief aid to win votes, (4) the problem of acquiring timely and accurate preference revelations, (5) glory seeking by government officials, and (6) the shortsightedness effect causing a bias in governmental decision making.
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页码:55 / 73
页数:19
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