Research on the Relational Contract in Alliances Governance

Alliances governance mechnism matters much for success of strategic alliances, especially for long - term relationships, so alliances partners pay much attention to alliances governance structure. In this paper, the authors apply theory of relational contract to modeling alliances governance structure that can effectively decrease opportunism. First, the authors focus on modeling alliances governance structure in one - shot game, and the results show that in short - term relationship, neither equity nor contractual alliances governance structure can achieve social first - best output. Then, by introducing relational contracts into alliances governance, the authors explore the self - enforcing conditions of relational contracts. It is shown that for the existence of relational contracts in repeated relationships, both alliances governance structures can be optimal. But the self - enforcing conditions of relational contract are quite different. Partners are required to be more patient to support relational contract under contractual alliances than under equity ones.