The Labor-Market Impact of San Francisco's Employer-Benefit Mandate

被引:4
|
作者
Colla, Carrie H. [1 ]
Dow, William H. [2 ]
Dube, Arindrajit [3 ]
机构
[1] Dartmouth Inst Hlth Policy & Clin Practice, Lebanon, NH 03766 USA
[2] Univ Calif Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
[3] Univ Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003 USA
来源
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS | 2017年 / 56卷 / 01期
关键词
HEALTH-INSURANCE; WAGE; DIFFERENCE; INFERENCE; COVERAGE; PROGRAM; HAWAII; POLICY;
D O I
10.1111/irel.12166
中图分类号
F24 [劳动经济];
学科分类号
020106 ; 020207 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We evaluate a San Francisco policy requiring employers to provide health benefits or contribute to a public-option health plan to better understand the incidence of employer mandates through their effects on wages, employment, and prices. We develop an individual case study approach combining border discontinuity in policies and permutation-type inference using other metropolitan areas. Findings indicate that employment patterns did not change appreciably following the policy, and there is little evidence of significant negative earnings in highly impacted sectors. However, approximately half of the incidence of the mandate in the restaurant sector fell on consumers via surcharges.
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页码:122 / 160
页数:39
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