Does lobbying of firms complement executive networks in determining executive compensation?

被引：2
|
作者：
Nandy, Monomita [1 ]
Lodh, Suman [2 ]
Wang, Jin [1 ]
Kaur, Jaskaran [1 ]
机构：
[1] Brunel Univ, Brunel Business Sch, Kingston Lane, Uxbridge UB8 3PH, Middx, England
[2] Middlesex Univ, Sch Business, London, England
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS | 2021年 / 26卷 / 03期
关键词：
behavioural agency theory; corporate lobbying; executive compensation; executive networks; CEO COMPENSATION; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; DIRECTOR NETWORKS; GENDER DIVERSITY; PERFORMANCE; OWNERSHIP; BOARD; TRUST; RISK; CONNECTIONS;
D O I：
10.1002/ijfe.2008
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
In this paper we predict and find that the lobbying activities of firms can complement executive networks in determining executive compensation. Firms of all sizes, after considering market competition as a governance mechanism, prefer to consider lobbying as a means of networking along with executive level networking to determine executive compensation. The empirical implication of the study provides guidance to scholars who should consider lobbying along with executive networks in determining executive compensation. The composite theoretical underpinning and the importance of information flow through lobbying activities of firms will be an important insight for policy makers involved in determining executive compensation.
引用
收藏
页码：4137 / 4162
页数：26
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Executive compensation in socially responsible firms
    Frye, Melissa B.
    Nelling, Edward
    Webb, Elizabeth
    [J]. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, 2006, 14 (05) : 446 - 455
  • [2] Does tunneling explain the sensitivity of executive compensation to other member firms' performance?
    Kim, Hyungseok
    Kim, Woochan
    [J]. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, 2020, 47 (9-10) : 1268 - 1289
  • [3] Does executive compensation affect firms' acquisition decisions? Evidence from China
    Jiang, Lin
    Kling, Gerhard
    Bo, Hong
    [J]. ASIA PACIFIC BUSINESS REVIEW, 2021, 27 (05) : 731 - 748
  • [4] Executive compensation and risk: The case of internet firms
    Dee, CC
    Lulseged, A
    Nowlin, TS
    [J]. JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2005, 12 (01) : 80 - 96
  • [5] Executive Compensation and Board Governance in US Firms
    Conyon, Martin J.
    [J]. ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 2014, 124 (574): : F60 - F89
  • [6] Determinants of executive compensation in privately held firms
    Banghoj, Jesper
    Gabrielsen, Gorm
    Petersen, Christian
    Plenborg, Thomas
    [J]. ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE, 2010, 50 (03): : 481 - 510
  • [7] Executive compensation and compensation risk: evidence from technology firms
    Dunn, Paul
    He, Zhongzhi
    Trabelsi, Samir
    Yu, Zhimin
    [J]. MANAGERIAL AUDITING JOURNAL, 2019, 34 (03) : 289 - 304
  • [8] Does risk matter for executive compensation?
    Eklund, Mehtap Aldogan
    [J]. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS IN SOCIETY, 2022, 22 (01): : 159 - 172
  • [9] Does Executive Compensation Affect Accounting Irregularities? Evidence From Listed Firms in Indonesia
    Soepriyanto, Gatot
    Kuncoro, Engkos Achmad
    Zudana, Arfian Erma
    Averine, Livia
    [J]. SAGE OPEN, 2022, 12 (03):
  • [10] Executive compensation of immigrant-founder firms in the USA
    Hsieh, Chialing
    Pandey, Vivek
    Wang, Hongxia
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANAGERIAL FINANCE, 2019, 15 (04) : 546 - 563
12345