Determinants of executive compensation in privately held firms

被引：25

作者：

Banghoj, Jesper ^{[1
]}

Gabrielsen, Gorm ^{[2
]}

Petersen, Christian ^{[1
]}

Plenborg, Thomas ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Copenhagen Business Sch, Dept Accounting & Auditing, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark

[2] Copenhagen Business Sch, Ctr Stat, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark

来源：

ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE | 2010年 / 50卷 / 03期

关键词：

Board characteristics; Compensation contracts; Executive characteristics; Performance measures; Quality of bonus plans; M52; Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; CEO PAY; PERFORMANCE; OWNERSHIP; REMUNERATION; SENSITIVITY;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1467-629X.2009.00335.x

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We examine what determines executive compensation in privately held firms. Our study is motivated by the fact that most studies in this area rely on data from publicly traded firms. Further, the few studies that are based on data from privately held firms only examine a limited number of determinants of executive compensation. Our findings indicate that the pay-to-performance relation is weak. Board size and ownership concentration are the only corporate governance characteristics that explain variations in executive compensation. Executive characteristics like skills, title and educational attainment all explain variations in executive compensation. Contrary to our expectations, we do not find a stronger pay-to-performance relation in firms with better designed bonus plans.

引用

页码：481 / 510

页数：30

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