EQUILIBRIA EXISTENCE AND CHARACTERIZATION IN AUCTIONS: ACHIEVEMENTS AND OPEN QUESTIONS

被引：5
|
作者：
de Castro, Luciano I. [1 ]
Karney, Daniel H. [2 ]
机构：
[1] Northwestern Univ, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
[2] Univ Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS | 2012年 / 26卷 / 05期
关键词：
Equilibrium existence; Multi-unit auctions; Single-unit auctions; PURE STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; DISCONTINUOUS GAMES; RATIONAL-EXPECTATIONS; BAYESIAN PLAYERS; PRICE AUCTIONS; EFFICIENCY; SINGLE; CONVERGENCE; UNIQUENESS;
D O I：
10.1111/j.1467-6419.2011.00680.x
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Establishing existence and characterizing equilibria are both important achievements in the study of auctions. However, we recognize that equilibria existence results form the basis for well accepted characterizations. In this survey, we review the landmark results and highlight open questions regarding equilibria existence and characterizations in auctions. In addition, we review the standard assumptions underlying these results, and discuss the suitability of the Nash equilibrium solution concept. We focus our review on single-object auctions, but also review results in multi-unit, divisible, combinatorial and double auctions.
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页码：911 / 932
页数：22
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