Existence of monotone equilibria in large double auctions

被引:0
|
作者
Barelli, Paulo [1 ]
Govindan, Srihari [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Rochester, Dept Econ, Rochester, NY 14627 USA
关键词
Monotone equilibrium; large auctions; rational expectations equilibrium; degree theory; C62; D44; D82;
D O I
10.3982/TE5486
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We provide a shorter proof of the main result in Reny and Perry (2006, Econometrica) by establishing a lower semicontinuity property of auctions as the number of traders goes to infinity, leveraging existence of equilibria in the limit auction. Our proof also eliminates two of the assumptions in their paper.
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页码:565 / 582
页数:18
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