The role of location choice in strategic export promotion policy: capital liberalization incentives of exporting countries

被引:0
|
作者
Kiyono, Kazuharu [2 ]
Wei, Fang [1 ]
机构
[1] Waseda Univ, Grad Sch Econ, Tokyo 1698050, Japan
[2] Waseda Univ, Fac Polit Sci & Econ, Tokyo 1698050, Japan
关键词
strategic export policy; inward direct investment; capital liberalization; asymmetric costs;
D O I
10.1007/s00712-008-0008-0
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study an international capital liberalization game where exporting countries choose either to open the domestic market for capital inflow or not. We clarify that if the cost difference is large enough, the less productive country is indifferent between closing or opening for inward direct investment, and the more productive country never has an incentive to open. International coordination to open markets is not always necessary in our capital liberalization game since it may deteriorate the welfare of the more productive country and will make world welfare worse off.
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页码:55 / 74
页数:20
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