RULES VERSUS DISCRETION IN FISCAL POLICY

被引：3
|
作者：
Bianchi, Carluccio [1 ]
Menegatti, Mario [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Pavia, I-27100 Pavia, Italy
[2] Univ Parma, I-43100 Parma, Italy
来源：
MANCHESTER SCHOOL | 2012年 / 80卷 / 05期
关键词：
MONETARY-POLICY; POSITIVE THEORY; COMMITMENT; DEFICITS;
D O I：
10.1111/j.1467-9957.2011.02240.x
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper applies the KydlandPrescott framework of dynamic inconsistency to fiscal policy by considering the trade-off between output and debt stabilization. In a static framework, commitment to debt stabilization is superior to discretion only when the public debtGDP ratio is high. Discretion, though, is always inferior to an optimal fiscal rule, which however entails a positive predetermined debt growth. As usual, the introduction of uncertainty determines an additional advantage for discretion. Finally, if dynamic considerations are introduced, the optimal fiscal rule is characterized by positive debt growth in the short run and debt stabilization in the long run.
引用
收藏
页码：603 / 629
页数：27
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