Theory-driven specifications of utility theory. A reply to Kelle/Ludemann and Opp/Friedrichs

Assumptions on initial conditions of a theory can be ''thin'' if they simply allow an application of the theory and are mainly a matter of empirical assessment, or can be ''thick'' if they are adding decisive content to the theory and if they come about under explicit theoretical guidance (even when they are empirically assessed). I had been arguing in the past that assumptions about preferences and restrictions cannot be thin when we deal with utility theory in sociology. I had called thick assumptions on initial conditions ''bridge assumptions'' because they bridge the gap between reality and a (relatively speaking) empty utility theory, Kelle/Ludemann and Opp had originally pushed the view that bridge assumptions should be thin rather than thick. As one can see from their recent comments on my last article in this journal on the matter of bridge assumptions, they have moved a good deal in the direction of thick bridge assumptions. For the sociological use of utility theory, this is a large step forward and it would be good if it were the beginning of a broader and informed discussion on this important matter.