We investigate whether corporate finance incentives affect the extent of corporate hedging with property insurance. Using a database that contains detailed insurance information, we document a positive relation between the expected costs of distress and property insurance coverage. We also show that the dividend payout ratio is negatively associated with property insurance coverage, consistent with the view that firms with high payout ratios insure a smaller fraction of properties due to cash flows in excess of investment needs, easy access to capital markets, or both. Different incentives are important for the insurance deductible and limit of coverage, and the deductible and limit of coverage are substitutes. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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J.M. Tull School of Accounting, Terry College of Business, University of Georgia, AthensJ.M. Tull School of Accounting, Terry College of Business, University of Georgia, Athens
Ayers B.C.
Lefanowicz C.E.
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Eli Broad College of Business, Michigan State University, N230 North Business Complex, East LansingJ.M. Tull School of Accounting, Terry College of Business, University of Georgia, Athens
Lefanowicz C.E.
Robinson J.R.
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Red McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712-1172J.M. Tull School of Accounting, Terry College of Business, University of Georgia, Athens