Measuring the Economic Effects of Competition Law Enforcement

被引：9
|
作者：
Don, Henk [1 ]
Kemp, Ron [2 ,3 ]
van Sinderen, Jarig [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Erasmus Univ, Rotterdam, Netherlands
[2] NMa, Netherlands Competit Author, The Hague, Netherlands
[3] Wageningen Univ, Wageningen, Netherlands
来源：
ECONOMIST-NETHERLANDS | 2008年 / 156卷 / 04期
关键词：
antitrust; competition law enforcement; deterrence; merger control; welfare effects; D61; L40; L50;
D O I：
10.1007/s10645-008-9107-0
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Together with a move from a rules-based legal approach to a more economic approach in competition cases, the economic effects of competition law enforcement have received increasing attention. Measuring these effects is important for external accountability of the Competition Authority, for quality control of its decisions and for evaluating the effectiveness of the competition law. This raises many issues in measurement, including the choice of counterfactual, the choice of effects to be measured, and the proper use of available data. The papers in this Special Issue of De Economist discuss these and related issues, based on a broad range of experience in competition law enforcement.
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页码：341 / 348
页数：8
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