Competition with Exclusive Contracts and Market-Share Discounts

被引：46
|
作者：
Calzolari, Giacomo [1 ]
Denicolo, Vincenzo [2 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Bologna, Dept Econ, I-40126 Bologna, Italy
[2] Univ Leicester, Dept Econ, Leicester LE1 7RH, Leics, England
[3] Univ Bologna, I-40126 Bologna, Italy
来源：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2013年 / 103卷 / 06期
关键词：
COMMON-AGENCY; BUYER POWER; PARTICIPATION; REVELATION;
D O I：
10.1257/aer.103.6.2384
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We analyze firms that compete by means of exclusive contracts and market-share discounts (conditional on the seller's share of customers' total purchases). With incomplete information about demand, firms have a unilateral incentive to use these contractual arrangements to better extract buyers' informational rents. However, exclusive contracts intensify competition, thus reducing prices and profits and (in all Pareto undominated equilibria) increasing welfare. Market-share discounts, by contrast, produce a double marginalization effect that leads to higher prices and harms buyers. We discuss the implications of these results for competition policy.
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页码：2384 / 2411
页数：28
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