This paper studies the influence of agency conflicts on the irreversibility effect. Using a dynamic variant of the static Baron and Myerson (Econometrica 50(4):911-930, 1982) adverse selection model, we characterize under which circumstances the irreversibility effect arises in the presence and absence of an agency conflict. In particular, we find that in the presence of an agency conflict the irreversibility effect arises in more circumstances than in the standard first-best analysis that abstracts from agency problems.
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Kyung Hee Univ, Sch Management, 26 Kyungheedae Ro, Seoul 02447, South KoreaKyung Hee Univ, Sch Management, 26 Kyungheedae Ro, Seoul 02447, South Korea
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Univ South Carolina, Darla Moore Sch Business, Sonoco Int Business Dept, Columbia, SC 29208 USA
Sungkyunkwan Univ SKKU, SKK Business Sch, Seoul, South KoreaUniv Alberta, Edmonton, AB T6C 4G9, Canada
Guedhami, Omrane
Mansi, Sattar A.
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Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061 USAUniv Alberta, Edmonton, AB T6C 4G9, Canada
Mansi, Sattar A.
Yoon, Hyo Jin
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Univ Texas El Paso, El Paso, TX 79968 USAUniv Alberta, Edmonton, AB T6C 4G9, Canada