Ownership Structure, Intensive Board Monitoring, and Firm Value: Evidence from Korea

被引:8
|
作者
Byun, Hee Sub [1 ]
Lee, Ji Hye [2 ]
Park, Kyung Suh [2 ]
机构
[1] Korea Univ, Asian Inst Corp Governance, Seoul 136701, South Korea
[2] Korea Univ, Sch Business, Seoul 136701, South Korea
关键词
Monitoring committee; Outside directors; Firm value; Controlling shareholders; Emerging markets; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; AGENCY COSTS; DIRECTORS; MARKET; PERFORMANCE;
D O I
10.1111/ajfs.12012
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This article measures proxies for intensive board monitoring using Korean corporate governance data. We find that intensive board monitoring has a positive effect on firm value in Korea. We also explore the relationship between controlling shareholders' ownership and intensive board monitoring efficiency. We confirm that direct ownership by controlling shareholders moderates the relationship between intensive board monitoring and firm value. For firms with greater disparity between controlling shareholders' control rights and cash flow rights, the effect of intensive board monitoring on firm value decreases. These results suggest that the interplay among various internal control mechanisms affects corporate governance efficiency.
引用
收藏
页码:191 / 227
页数:37
相关论文
共 50 条