The Autocrat's Moral-Legal Dilemma: Popular Morality and Legal Institutions in China

Authoritarian regimes sometimes professionalize their legal systems to govern more effectively. Yet when quasi-autonomous courts rule in contradiction to popular conceptions of right and wrong-popular morality-it might threaten citizens' trust in the regime. We use the case of contemporary China to investigate this "moral-legal dilemma"-the competing needs of legal development and the satisfaction of popular justice concerns. Four case studies demonstrate that when court rulings conflict with popular morality, the party-state selectively alters decisions, so long as intervention does not significantly jeopardize the integrity of the legal system. Two online survey experiments then assess citizens' reactions to moral-legal conflict in court rulings. We find that people are more likely to experience "moral dissonance" when legal decisions conflict with popular morality. We do not find that moral-legal conflict in court rulings significantly undermines individuals' trust in the regime. Our analysis underscores the need for more attention to the moral foundations of authoritarian rule.