Strategic complementarities and nested potential games

被引:4
|
作者
Uno, Hiroshi [1 ]
机构
[1] Osaka Univ, Inst Social & Econ Res, Osaka 5670047, Japan
关键词
Strategic complementarities; Potential games; Existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium; EQUILIBRIUM; SUBSTITUTES;
D O I
10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.10.002
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper reports that every finite game of strategic complementarities is a nested pseudo-potential game defined by Uno [Uno, H., 2007. Nested potential games. Economics Bulletin 3(17), 1-8] if the action set of each player is one-dimensional, except possibly for one player. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:728 / 732
页数:5
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