Resolution of financial distress under Chapter 11

被引:14
|
作者
Annabi, Amira [2 ]
Breton, Michele [1 ]
Francois, Pascal [1 ]
机构
[1] HEC Montreal, Montreal, PQ H3T 2A7, Canada
[2] Manhattan Coll, New York, NY USA
来源
基金
加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;
关键词
Credit risk; Chapter; 11; Game theory; Dynamic programming; DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS; DIRECT COSTS; BANKRUPTCY; REORGANIZATION; FIRMS; LIQUIDATION; VALUATION; PRIORITY; EQUITY;
D O I
10.1016/j.jedc.2012.06.004
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We develop a contingent claims model for a firm in financial distress with a formal account for renegotiations under the U.S. bankruptcy procedure (known as Chapter 11). Shareholders and two classes of creditors (senior and junior) alternatively propose a reorganization plan subject to a vote. The bankruptcy judge can intervene in any renegotiation round to impose a plan. The multiple-stage bargaining process is solved in a non-cooperative game-theory setting. The calibrated model yields the liquidation rate, the duration of Chapter 11 and the frequency of deviations from the Absolute Priority Rule, which are consistent with empirical evidence. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:1867 / 1887
页数:21
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