CEO Pay Sensitivity (Delta and Vega) and Corporate Social Responsibility

被引:17
|
作者
Ikram, Atif [1 ]
Li, Zhichuan [2 ]
MacDonald, Travis [3 ]
机构
[1] Arizona State Univ, Dept Finance, Tempe, AZ 85281 USA
[2] Univ Western Ontario, Ivey Business Sch, London, ON N6A 3K7, Canada
[3] Univ Western Ontario, Dept Econ, London, ON N6A 3K7, Canada
关键词
executive compensation; managerial incentives; corporate social responsibility; corporate social performance; firm risk; delta; vega; agency problem; STOCK OPTION PORTFOLIOS; STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT; FIRM VALUE; COMPENSATION; PERFORMANCE; RISK; INCENTIVES; AGENCY; PRICE;
D O I
10.3390/su12197941
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
We use CEO pay sensitivity to stock performance (delta) and stock volatility (vega) to provide empirical evidence that CEO compensation structure influences firm Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) performance. We find that delta has no significant effect on CSR, while vega has a strong, causal relationship with CSR. Our findings suggest that CEOs do not view CSR as value enhancing, but as a way to increase their own compensation through vega. Firms that want to improve their social performance should consider vega as an important compensation incentive for executives.
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页数:20
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