MITIGATING PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS IN BASE-OF-THE-PYRAMID MARKETS: AN IDENTITY SPILLOVER PERSPECTIVE

被引:61
|
作者
Kistruck, Geoffrey M. [1 ]
Sutter, Christopher J. [2 ]
Lount, Robert B., Jr. [2 ]
Smith, Brett R. [1 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Miami Univ, Oxford, OH 45056 USA
[2] Ohio State Univ, Fisher Coll Business, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
[3] Miami Univ, Inst Entrepreneurship, Oxford, OH 45056 USA
来源
ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL | 2013年 / 56卷 / 03期
关键词
PSYCHOLOGICAL OWNERSHIP; INCENTIVE CONTRACTS; PERFORMANCE; IDENTIFICATION; STRATEGIES; BOTTOM; MODEL; WORK; ENTREPRENEURSHIP; GOVERNANCE;
D O I
10.5465/amj.2011.0336
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The potential for profitably distributing products to previously underserved "base-of-the-pyramid" (BOP) markets as a means of poverty alleviation has received growing interest within the management field. However, such business models often struggle with the agency costs that arise between the firm and local sales agents as the institutions and infrastructure in BOP markets make traditional contractual and monitoring mechanisms difficult and expensive to employ. We present the results of two complementary studies which were both conducted with salespeople in rural Guatemala. The first study employed a quasi-experimental field-study combined with in-depth interviews, while the second study was a laboratory experiment. The results of the studies suggest that identity-based mechanisms can potentially mitigate agency costs through a positive identity spillover effect in multiproduct settings.
引用
收藏
页码:659 / 682
页数:24
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