Decentralization and Governance

被引:245
|
作者
Faguet, Jean-Paul [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, London WC2A 2AE, England
关键词
local government; accountability; political competition; instability; limits on power; health; ACCOUNTABILITY; DEMOCRACY; POLITICS; BOLIVIA; DESIGN;
D O I
10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.01.002
中图分类号
F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
The most important theoretical argument concerning decentralization is that it can make government more accountable and responsive to the governed. Improving governance is also a central justification of real-world reformers. But the literature has mostly focused on policy-relevant outcomes, such as education and health services, public investment, and fiscal deficits. This paper examines how decentralization affects governance, in particular how it might increase political competition, improve public accountability, reduce political instability, and impose incentive-compatible limits on government power, but also threaten fiscal sustainability. Such improvements in governance can help spur the broad historical transitions that define development. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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页码:2 / 13
页数:12
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