Truthful Mechanism Design for Multiregion Mobile Crowdsensing

被引:1
|
作者
Qiao, Yu [1 ]
Wu, Jun [2 ]
Cheng, Hao [1 ]
Huang, Zilan [1 ]
He, Qiangqiang [1 ]
Wang, Chongjun [1 ]
机构
[1] Nanjing Univ, Natl Key Lab Novel Software Technol, Nanjing, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
[2] Nanjing Univ Finance & Econ, Jiangsu Prov Key Lab E Business, Nanjing, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
INCENTIVE MECHANISMS; AUCTION;
D O I
10.1155/2020/8834983
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
In the age of the development of artificial intelligence, we face the challenge on how to obtain high-quality data set for learning systems effectively and efficiently. Crowdsensing is a new powerful tool which will divide tasks between the data contributors to achieve an outcome cumulatively. However, it arouses several new challenges, such as incentivization. Incentive mechanisms are significant to the crowdsensing applications, since a good incentive mechanism will attract more workers to participate. However, existing mechanisms failed to consider situations where the crowdsourcer has to hire capacitated workers or workers from multiregions. We design two objectives for the proposed multiregion scenario, namely, weighted mean and maximin. The proposed mechanisms maximize the utility of services provided by a selected data contributor under both constraints approximately. Also, extensive simulations are conducted to verify the effectiveness of our proposed methods.
引用
收藏
页数:15
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