Foreign ownership and bribery: Agency and institutional perspectives

被引:17
|
作者
Yi, Jingtao [1 ]
Teng, Da [2 ]
Meng, Shuang [1 ]
机构
[1] Renmin Univ China, Sch Business, 59 Zhongguancun St, Beijing 100872, Peoples R China
[2] Coventry Univ, Coventry Business Sch, Priory St, Coventry CV1 5FB, W Midlands, England
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Bribery; Institutions; Auditing; Multinational firms; DEVELOPING-COUNTRY MNES; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; ORGANIZATIONAL CORRUPTION; FIRM; DISCLOSURE; BUSINESS; IMPACT; PERFORMANCE; STRATEGY; MARKET;
D O I
10.1016/j.ibusrev.2017.05.001
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In this study we examine the effectiveness of formal institutions (as the macro-level mechanism) and external auditing (as the micro-level mechanism) in controlling multinational firms' engagement in bribery. We adopt World Bank's data and investigate 38,673 firms in 113 countries. Our results suggest that a firm's engagement in bribery is positively related to its foreign ownership. Furthermore, we demonstrate the substitute effects of formal institutions and external auditing in controlling this unethical activity. We argue that in a situation whereby formal institutions are weak, a firm's internal governance mechanism plays a vital role in controlling bribery.
引用
收藏
页码:34 / 45
页数:12
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