On one-sided versus two-sided matching games

被引:12
|
作者
Quint, T
机构
[1] Department of Mathematics, University of Nevada, Reno
关键词
D O I
10.1006/game.1996.0078
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We consider the ''one-sided matching'' models of Shapley and Scarf and Tijs et al. and a one-sided analogue of Demange and Gale's two-sided matching market. We analyze these games by considering each trader as both ''buyer'' and ''seller'' and seeing whether results carry over from the two-sided matching literature. For the most part, they do in the transferable utility (TU) case but not in the nontransferable utility model. Our results in the TU case parallel work done by Shapley and Shubik for two-sided markets. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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页码:124 / 134
页数:11
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