Effects of Transport Regulation on the Oil Market: Does Market Power Matter?

被引：3
|
作者：
Kverndokk, Snorre [1 ]
Rosendahl, Knut Einar [2 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Ragnar Frisch Ctr Econ Res, NO-0349 Oslo, Norway
[2] UMB Sch Econ & Business, NO-1432 As, Norway
[3] Norway Stat Norway, NO-0033 Oslo, Norway
来源：
SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 2013年 / 115卷 / 03期
关键词：
Carbon leakage; monopoly; oil consumption; transport policy instruments; terms of trade; D42; Q54; R48; FUEL-ECONOMY STANDARDS; EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES; MONOPOLY; EXTRACTION; EFFICIENCY; EMISSIONS; BIOFUELS; POLICIES; TAXATION; OPEC;
D O I：
10.1111/sjoe.12013
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Instruments used to regulate the consumption of oil in the transport sector include fuel taxes, biofuel requirements, and fuel-efficiency standards. However, the effects that these have on oil consumption and price vary. If market power is present in the oil market, the directions of change in consumption and price might contrast with those in a competitive market. As a result, the market structure affects not only the effectiveness of the policy instruments used to reduce oil consumption, but also the terms of trade and carbon leakage. In particular, reduced oil consumption, as a result of increased fuel-efficiency standards, will unambiguously increase the price of oil under a monopoly.
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页码：662 / 694
页数：33
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